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The Welfare Caseload, Economic Growth and Welfare-to-Work Policies:
An Analysis of Five Urban Areas
Abstract
This paper uses quarterly data on AFDC (later TANF) recipients in five major urban areas
to examine the relative importance of policy reform and economic conditions in explaining the
dynamics of the welfare caseload and the employment experiences of welfare leavers.  We find
that changes in both welfare exits and entries played an important role in the caseload declines of
the 1990s.  Policy changes were primary in causing changes in these flows, with economic
conditions of secondary importance.  Although welfare reforms were accompanied by substantial
increases in the employment of those leaving welfare, this appears to be largely the result of an
increasingly tight labor market rather than the reforms. 
1The Welfare Caseload, Economic Growth and Welfare-to-Work Policies:
An Analysis of Five Urban Areas
I. Introduction
The last decade has seen extraordinary changes in the welfare programs supporting
indigent single parents and their children in the U.S.  From its inception in the 1930s through the
1960s, federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) operated on the implicit
assumption that a mother's primary job should be caring for her children.  With greater
acceptance of working mothers, public opinion has gradually shifted away from this view,
inducing an increased emphasis on the importance of employment as an alternative to
government aid.
Between the late 1980s and 1998, the U.S. welfare system was transformed from a
structure allocating cash and in-kind payments according to federal rules to a variety of programs
designed by the states focusing on providing transitional financial support and aid in obtaining
employment.  Although the Work Incentive program (WIN), in effect since 1967, required states
to set up programs to aid welfare recipients in obtaining employment, most welfare recipients
received no actual services.  Despite some differences across states, including large differences in
grant levels, federal AFDC rules forced states to set up systems that emphasized complex
eligibility rules, often creating bureaucratic obstacles to recipients who wished to obtain
employment (Bane and Ellwood 1994, chapter 1).  
Although passage of  the federal Family Support Act of 1988 established the JOBS
program, which for the first time required that states provide employment-related services to a
2substantial share of welfare recipients, major program changes did not occur until the 1990s,
when many states were granted federal waivers that allowed them to operate programs that
modified AFDC rules.  Changes to an employment-focused system culminated with passage of
the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996, which replaced AFDC
with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The new legislation specified explicit
work requirements for participants as well as limitations on the length of time aid could be
received.  In contrast to AFDC, TANF did not have the legal status of an entitlement for
individuals who met eligibility requirements but instead allowed states to provide aid in accord
with a wide range of program structures.
The legislative benchmarks provide only a rough indication of the changes occurring in
the effective administration of AFDC and TANF programs.  In the 1990s, under federal waivers,
many states imposed increasingly stringent work and training requirements on recipients. 
Equally important, administrative directives in many states shifted program emphasis away from
the provision of aid to families and toward finding employment alternatives.  Bureaucratic
change has accelerated as states develop programs under the 1996 federal reform (Nathan and
Gais 1999).
After moderate increases through most of the previous two decades, for the most part
tracing increases in the U.S. population, the AFDC caseload had reached 4.0 million by 1990.  In
the next four years, the caseload increased rapidly to a peak of 5.0 million and then began a
decline, falling to 3.9 million in 1997, when AFDC was replaced by TANF in most states.  By
March 1999, the caseload had declined to 2.7 million, a level not seen since 1971.  While welfare
policy has clearly changed over this period, it is unclear whether these changes are responsible
3for observed caseload declines. After economic stagnation in the early 1990s, growth in the
remainder of the decade has been extremely strong, and it appears likely that the economy is at
least partly responsible for observed caseload movements. 
The current study examines the dynamic structure of AFDC/TANF participation and the
labor market involvement of participants starting in the early 1990s through 1997 in each of the
core counties containing Atlanta, Baltimore, Fort Lauderdale, Houston and Kansas City.  All
these cities display a recent decline in welfare caseloads, consistent with the national trend. 
By focusing on five major cities, our analyses allow us to begin to examine the extent to which
differences in local administrative directives and local labor markets contribute to observed
trends.  
While early studies, based on data from the 1970s, suggested that employment was of
relatively little importance in explaining why individuals left the welfare rolls (O'Neill, Bassi and
Wolf 1987), recent research suggests that it plays an important and possibly growing role (Blank
1989; Harris 1993; Hoynes 1996).  Studies that examine variation in AFDC caseloads in the
1970s and 1980s make clear that both economic conditions and policy changes influenced
caseloads.  In an analysis of aggregate quarterly data for the U.S. over the period 1973 through
1991, Peskin (1993) found that unemployment had a substantial impact on the caseload, as did
the welfare reforms instituted in the early 1980s.  The growth in single parent families was also a
primary factor tending to increase caseloads (see also Moffitt 1998).  A careful study by Black,
McKinnish and Sanders (1999) opens the possibility that the long-run impacts of economic
factors are stronger than these results might suggest.  They show that even when welfare
recipients do not to respond to transitory variation in economic growth, they may be strongly
4influenced by permanent changes.
There has been much recent work attempting to identify the relative importance of
economic conditions and policy reform in explaining caseload growth and decline in the 1990s. 
Blank (1997) examines annual caseload data for 51 states and the District of Columbia for the
period 1977-1995.  While she finds that economic conditions and policy changes influence
caseloads, her model does not explain the national caseload increase in the early 1990s to its peak
in 1994.  However, the national caseload decline of just over 5 percent in 1994-1995 is explained
by her model, with economic factors explaining about two-thirds of the decline.  A highly
influential study by the Council of Economic Advisors (1997), also using annual caseload data
across states over two decades, focuses on explaining the 20 percent decline in the welfare
caseload from 1993 to1996, attributing 44 percent to economic growth and 30 percent to the
impacts of policy changes associated with federal waivers.   The specification of policy measures
in this model has been criticized because it includes lead effects, undercutting the causal
interpretation (Martini and Wiseman 1997).  Omitting these measures reduces the estimated
impact of policy measures by about half.
A revised analysis by the Council of Economic Advisors (1999), which employs a model
that omits the controversial lag measures of policy, finds that, for the period 1996-1998, the
imposition of TANF is responsible for about one third of the observed 33 percent decline in the
caseload, while economic factors contributed less than one fifth.  Other work tends to confirm
the importance of policy, although estimated impacts vary (Moffitt 1999; Bartik and Eberts
1999), and attempts to identify the impacts of different kinds of policies have not been successful
(Gittleman 2000).  The notable exception to the finding that policy variables matter is that of
5Ziliak et al. (1998), who find that policy has little impact and that economic factors explain all of
the caseload decline in the period 1993-1996.  Their analysis differs from that of most others in
that it uses monthly data for the period 1987-1996.  However, the difference in their results is
primarily due to the particular lag specification they use, as well as the shorter time series (Figlio
and Ziliak 1999; Wallace and Blank 1999).  Studies also show that welfare reform induces
increases in labor force participation (Bishop 1998; Moffitt 1999), as well as increases in
earnings, declines in poverty, and increases in marriage rates among those most likely to be
eligible for welfare (Schoeni and Blank 2000).
Changes in tax codes and related policy may have played a role in reducing welfare
caseloads.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999a) show that annual employment rates for single
mothers increased from 74 percent in 1992 to 82 percent in 1996, while the rate for childless
single women remained at 93 percent.  The most important policy change during this period, they
argue, was in the Earned Income Tax Credit, which increased take-home pay by more than
$1,000 for a single mother earning $10,000.  Their structural models suggest that about one third
of the relative growth in labor force participation can be traced to the EITC, while somewhat
smaller portions are due to expansion of the Medicaid program and to welfare reforms associated
with waivers  (see also Meyer and Rosenbaum 1999b; and Ellwood 1999).  Although we know of
no attempt to directly estimate the impact of changes in the EITC on welfare declines, these
results suggest a substantial effect.
If welfare reform is responsible for some of the decline in caseloads, it is natural to judge
the reforms, in part, by how those leaving welfare are faring.  Since the goal of many policy
changes was to replace welfare with gainful employment, one might hope for an increased
6movement from welfare to employment.  On the other hand, many administrative changes may
have had the effect of discouraging individuals from receiving public assistance even when their
employment opportunities are very limited.  As Brueckner (2000) notes, the structure of federal
welfare reform creates increased financial incentives for states to reduce welfare rolls, even in the
absence of job opportunities, since it replaces a federal-state cost-sharing system with a block
grant.  On the other hand, by increasing state control over the program, it may facilitate the
ability of states to implement policies that are politically popular, which may well lead to greater
resources for employment-focused activities.
There are a number of recent attempts to determine the employment experiences of those
leaving welfare in the 1990s (Brauner and Loprest 1999; Cancian et al. 1999; Loprest 1999;
Parrott 1998; Tweedie et al. 1999).  We know that a large share of welfare leavers are employed,
although their average wages are low.  Nonetheless, their labor market experiences are highly
heterogeneous, with some better off than they were while receiving welfare and others
appreciably worse off.   As caseloads decline, it is clear that many of those leaving welfare
include long-term recipients and others with substantial barriers to obtaining employment (Kalil
et al. 1998), and that wages in the jobs available to them will be low (Lawson and King 1997).
The results of these studies, however, provide little information on how former recipients
have been influenced by recent reforms.  Many of these analyses focus on whether welfare
leavers under the reformed policies are better off after leaving welfare than while receiving
welfare.  Given that those who leave welfare are a selected group, consisting of those whose
opportunities have improved the most, this kind of comparison tells us little about program
impact.  It is necessary to examine the experiences of those leaving welfare under different policy
7regimes to infer the impact of policy changes on welfare leavers' experiences.  Tweedie et al.
(1999) review 21 state-level studies that examine employment outcomes for leavers.  In most of
these studies, the period of time over which welfare recipients exited the program is less than a
year.  The most extended analysis considers welfare exits over 27 months, still too short to
separate out the impacts of policy and economic conditions.
The current study examines employment outcomes for those leaving welfare over a
period spanning up to eight years during the 1990s.  This covers the period of welfare reform and
allows us to begin to disentangle the effects of policy and economic changes on the employment
experiences of leavers.  Whereas most of the studies dealing with the welfare caseload use
specifications that attempt to predict caseload size, we examine separately the determinants of
rates of flow into and out of welfare.  Klerman and Haider (2000) argue that it is these rates that
are most directly influenced by economic and policy factors, and their empirical tests, based on
analyses of the welfare caseload in California counties, suggest that predicting caseload produces
substantial bias.
Our work builds on that of Lane and Stevens (1995) and Lane, Shi and Stevens (1997),
who have used administrative data on employment and AFDC participation in Maryland to
examine the dynamics of welfare and work.  The research reported here is unique in that it
focuses on how dynamics have shifted over this recent period of extraordinary change in five
geographically distinct metropolitan areas.  
In the following section, we describe our approach and data sources, detailing state and
local program changes occurring in the 1990s over the period of our study.  The next two
sections describe analytical results.  We first identify the relative importance of changes in
1In Fort Lauderdale, the central county (Broward) corresponds to the metropolitan area.
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inflows and outflows in explaining the caseload declines in each of our sites.  We consider the
role of economic conditions and policy in determining these flows.  Next, we turn to examining
the employment experiences of former welfare recipients during this period, considering how
economic conditions and policy contribute to the employment of recipients.  The final section
concludes with an emphasis on policy implications.
II. Approach and Data Sources
Our data pertain to AFDC/TANF cases in the central county of each of five metropolitan
areas: Fulton County, GA (Atlanta); Baltimore City, MD (county equivalent unit); Broward
County, FL (Fort Lauderdale); Harris County, TX (Houston); and Jackson County, MO (Kansas
City).  In each case, the county contains all or almost all of the central city population.  With the
exception of Baltimore, where the county-level unit is the city, the county also contains
substantial population outside the central city, although a large share of the county's welfare
recipients are in the central city.  For four of our five sites, the metropolitan area includes more
than one county.  In these sites, the proportion of the metropolitan population included in the
central county varies from less than one fifth (for Fulton County, in the Atlanta Metropolitan
Area) to nearly three-quarters (for Harris County, in the Houston Metropolitan Area).1  Although
the convention of referencing each site by the name of its central city is followed here, all
information on welfare participation applies to the central county.
The analysis here is limited to families headed by females in the age range 18-64, who
2The selection criteria omit all men as well as women who received aid as part of the
AFDC-Unemployed Parent program.  Although the experiences of such individuals may be of
substantial interest, they make up a small share of the welfare population.
3Baltimore data extend to the third quarter of 1997.  Data for other sites extend to the
fourth quarter.
4The extent to which this measure underestimates actual employment in our population is
not known.  A recent report (Rockefeller Institute of Government 1999) reviews six studies
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received AFDC-Basic or TANF cash payments.2   The recipient unit can be viewed as the family,
or as the mother who is the payee.  Those who received only noncash benefits, even if they were
listed as participants in AFDC or TANF programs, are omitted.  For the purposes of examining
trends, monthly payments are aggregated to quarterly totals.
Because  administrative practices regarding the archiving of data differ across states, the
period of coverage for our sites varies somewhat.   Data for Baltimore and Kansas City are
available beginning in 1990, for Atlanta beginning in 1992, and for Fort Lauderdale and Houston
beginning in 1993.  In all sites, welfare measures extend though 1997.3
In order to examine the employment experiences of aid recipients, we have obtained
quarterly total earnings for all individuals in jobs covered by unemployment insurance in the
state, matching these to the records of AFDC/TANF recipients.  (For the analysis of Kansas City,
both Missouri and Kansas earnings data were used.)  The vast majority of employment in each
state is covered by these data, although illegal employment, self-employment and several classes
of nonprofit and federal employment are omitted.  The files also fail to identify employment for
individuals who left the state.  Of course, this measure captures only formal work arrangements,
since an array of activities individuals undertake for compensation are omitted.  It may be best
understood to identify involvement in mainstream economic activities.4
focusing on welfare recipients and former welfare recipients that attempt to measure the
difference between the actual employment rate and that measured by state unemployment
insurance wage-record data.  Most show that actual employment is about 20-25 percent above
that determined from wage record data.  One study implies a gap of 66 percent, while one shows
a gap of less than 5 percent.  Since our focus will be on changes over time, if the bias does not
change over time, the primary implications of our results will not be affected.
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Several measures are used to capture economic conditions at each site.  The
unemployment rate and job growth in the metropolitan area are used because they reflect the
local labor market but are unlikely to be influenced by welfare policy.  County level
unemployment and employment growth are also considered.
The measure of welfare receipt uses the quarter as the unit of analysis, so that those
receiving any payments in the quarter are viewed as recipients.  Given monthly turnover, the
caseload measured this way for any given quarter will be slightly greater than the highest
monthly caseload.  An individual is defined as an exit from welfare if she received welfare
during a quarter but not during the following quarter.  The exit rate is calculated as the number of
exits divided by the quarter's caseload.  Similarly, an individual is defined as entering welfare if
she was receiving welfare in one quarter but not in the preceding one.
The rate of employment for welfare exits is the proportion receiving earnings in a job
covered by unemployment insurance in a given quarter among those who left welfare in the prior
quarter.  This measure includes both individuals who obtained jobs prior to leaving welfare and
individuals who left welfare and found a job some time before the end of the following quarter.
Prior to the 1996 federal reform, major welfare reform at the local or state level occurred
as states received federal waivers permitting substantial deviations from AFDC rules.  Among
waiver provisions were the strengthening of work requirements, in some cases applied with
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special force to long-term recipients; restrictions on the length of time payments could be
received; and requirements that recipients enter into agreements to achieve self-sufficiency. 
Often recipients were provided with new services to aid them in obtaining employment, and in
some cases those leaving the welfare rolls were eligible to retain certain benefits, such as medical
care and childcare assistance, that would have been lost under earlier rules.  Major changes in the
administrative structures occurred as well.
The primary measures of policy used in existing studies of the welfare caseload are the
date of approval of federal waivers and the date of TANF implementation.  The consensus is that
waivers specifying work requirements were the most likely to influence movements into and out
of welfare.  Four of our sites are in states with such waivers approved over the data period, so
measures that identify the quarter in which each was granted are included.  However, waiver
approval dates may not fully capture actual policy changes at the local level.  In order to better
measure the actual timing of changes that influenced welfare policy, statutory or administrative
changes are identified that may have influenced the welfare program in each site based on our
observation of local and state policy directives and interviews with local administrators.  In some
cases, these dates indicate passage of state legislation, but date of implementation is used when it
is distinct and can be identified.
Table 1 provides a listing of dates for policy changes at each site and indicates how these
were coded in our analysis.  Dates in which waivers that allowed work requirements were
granted were coded in a dummy variable taking on a value of one in any quarter at or after the
specified date (these dates correspond to those in Ziliak et al. 1998).  A similar variable identifies
the date that TANF was implemented in the state.  Major administrative and legislative changes
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that could have affected welfare recipients were combined to form a composite for each site
indicating the number of changes that had occurred at the site up to that point.  While the various
reforms may not have influenced outcomes to the same degree, in the absence of any good
information about their relative importance, the scaling treats them as equal.  Events were
dropped from a composite when statistical tests showed that the sum combined measures with
different effects.  Finally, one event--the dropping from the welfare rolls in Atlanta of all
recipients who had not completed self-sufficiency pacts--was coded differently.  Since the
primary impact of this action was to elevate the exit rate in a single quarter, a dummy variable
was coded as one in that quarter only.
Our interest is in identifying the impacts of program policy broadly defined, whether
associated with federal waivers, TANF implementation, state legislation, or administrative
reform.  Given our data, we do not believe it is possible to identify the impacts of particular
policy changes.  Many of the dates in our measures of policy specify points in time when multi-
ple reforms occurred, for example, when a state’s general welfare reform bill was implemented. 
It should also be recognized that specific dates identified in our measures are often milestones in
a  largely continuous reform process.  In many cases, when programs were initiated they served
only a small number of clients, expanding over a period of as much as two years.  Nonetheless,
we suspect that the dates may be associated with activities that influence observed programs.  
Despite other changes, differences among the sites in payment levels that existed under
AFDC remained essentially unchanged during the period of the study.  At the conclusion of our
study period, the maximum benefit levels for a mother and two children were as follows: Atlanta,
$280; Baltimore, $388; Fort Lauderdale, $303; Houston, $188; and Kansas City, $292.
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III.  The Exit and Entry Components of the Caseload Decline
Trends in Caseload
 Figure 1, panel A, presents the welfare caseload over the 1990s for each area.  In each
case, the size of the caseload is at a peak in the early to mid-1990s, followed by a decline to the
current level.  However, there are substantial differences, as Table 2 shows.   Atlanta and Kansas
City experienced peak caseloads slightly later than the other areas.  The largest decline is in Fort
Lauderdale, of nearly 66 percent, while that in Houston is 57 percent.  Declines for Baltimore and
Atlanta are about one third, whereas the decline in Kansas City is about one quarter.
Panel B shows that unemployment rates for the metropolitan areas of all of our sites
follow a pattern similar to that of the caseloads.  After a period in the early 1990s of variable and
increasing unemployment, all areas experienced a strengthening labor market through the end of
the study period.  There are substantial differences, however, with Atlanta and Kansas City
showing appreciably lower unemployment than the other areas, while in Baltimore the recovery
is less steady and appears to reflect a season pattern.
Welfare Entry and Exit Rates
Figure 2 shows the exit and entry rate for each site.  The exit rate is the probability that a
case head receiving welfare payments in a quarter will not be receiving payments in the
following quarter.  The entry rate is the number of new cases in a given quarter divided by the
county population.  Substantial differences exist across regions. The lowest exit rates are in
Atlanta and Baltimore, which average around 8 percent.  In contrast, the average exit rate in
Kansas City is over 11 percent, while  Houston shows an average exit rate of over 15 percent,
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with the exit rate close to 20 percent in the most recent two years.  Fort Lauderdale displays rates
of nearly 20 percent until 1996, increasing to over 40 percent by the end of 1997.
Some of the observed patterns are clearly tied to administrative decisions.  In Atlanta
during the second quarter of 1997, the exit rate increases to 17 percent from 8 percent in the
previous quarter, and then declines to 11 percent in the following quarter.  This reflects the fact
that all welfare recipients who had not signed personal responsibility agreements were dropped
from the rolls that quarter.  The dramatic increase in the exit rate in Fort Lauderdale is probably
the result of Florida's welfare reform legislation (WAGES), which became effective statewide in
October 1996, specifying a maximum limit of two years of welfare receipt in any five-year
period.
To what degree have changes in entry and exit rates contributed to observed declines in
caseloads?   Figure 2 suggests that changes in both exit and entry rates have played a role.  Both
measures show the clearest trend for Houston and Fort Lauderdale, which are the sites with the
greatest caseload declines.  In the other sites there are similar--if weaker--trends.
In order to examine the relative importance of these flows, for each quarter we projected
what the caseload would be at the end of 1997 if the rates of entry and exit observed at that time
remained unchanged.  The point in time for which these rates produced the largest projected
caseload was then selected.  The maximum projected caseload in each site is listed in column 1
of Table 3.  The projected caseload is also calculated under the assumption that the rate of
welfare entry remained at the current level but that exit rate followed its observed path (column
2).  This is a measure of how much increases in exit rates alone contribute to the caseload
decline.   A similar projection is also produced holding constant the exit rate while allowing the
5Gittleman (2000) uses a similar approach to examine the role of changes in transition
rates in explaining the caseload decline at the national level.
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entry rate to follow its observed path (column 3).5
These projected caseloads may be compared with the observed final caseload (column 4),
which reflects the combined impacts of changes in both rates of exit and entry.  The final three
columns in Table 3 present the projected and observed caseload declines in percentage terms.  
The impact of each measure separately does not quite add to the total (especially for large
caseload declines), but the projections do give an indication of the relative importance of
variation in these flows.
The importance of changes in rates of exit and entry are quite different across the five
sites.  In Atlanta, changes in both exit rates and entry rates induce declines in the caseload, with
exit rates somewhat more important.  In Baltimore and Kansas City, exit rates are relatively more
important still.  In both Fort Lauderdale and Houston, increases in exit rates and declines in entry
rates have large impacts on the caseload, although the decline in the exit rate plays a less
important role for Houston.  
Overall, we can conclude that increases in exit rates have caused substantial caseload
declines at all of our sites, but that the role of declines in entry rates is more variable.  This may
reflect the fact that current welfare recipients are a focus of much of the national discussion of
welfare policies, and so programs focused on them may be relevant at almost all sites.  In
contrast, efforts to discourage new recipients, although frequently cited, may be less consistent
across sites.  Still, at each site, changes in rates of both exit and entry played a role in the
declining caseload and at least a third of the observed decline would have occurred if one of the
6At the national level, Gittleman (2000) also found that changes in transition rates both
onto and off of welfare played a role in the downturn in the welfare caseload beginning in the
early 1990s.  
7When we estimated this regression using the standard correction for autocorrelation, the
coefficient was 0.15 and highly significant.  The estimate in the table is based on ordinary least
squares in order to facilitate comparison across equations.
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two flows had not changed.6
Explaining Welfare Exit Rates
In order to examine the determinants of exit rates, we fitted a variety of models based on
a pooled time series for the five sites.  The dependent variable in each case is the natural
logarithm of the proportion of individuals exiting welfare following any given quarter, so
coefficients of dependent variables may be read as identifying proportional impacts.  In all
specifications, dummies for sites are included.  Many models also include site-specific time
trends to control for secular changes in demographic or other factors.  Seasonal dummies are
tested in each case, as are differences across sites in seasonal effects.
Unemployment and welfare exit rates display similar patterns over time, suggesting that
economic growth may play an important role in speeding exits from welfare.  Equation 1,
reported in Table 4, verifies that there is indeed a simple correlation.  In a  regression equation in
which unemployment predicts the exit rate, with differences between sites controlled with
dummy variables, each percentage point decline in the unemployment rate increases the natural
logarithm of the exit rate by 0.17.7
Controls for policy variables reveal that the apparent effects are largely spurious. 
Equation 2 in Table 4 includes our measures of welfare policy change at each location. 
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Controlling for welfare policy reduces the impact of unemployment by about two-thirds.  It is
clear that these measures of policy have substantially greater impact than unemployment. 
Inclusion of these measures also eliminates the autocorrelation that was observed in the error
terms in equation 1.
Both equations 1 and 2 in Table 4 exclude any trend effects, implicitly assuming that
changes over time can be traced to measured policy or labor market conditions.  Equation 3
allows each site to have its own linear trend, accounting for any exogenous continuous changes
that affect exit rates.   In this specification, the total impact of unemployment is further reduced
by two-thirds, and the coefficient is no longer statistically significant.  In contrast, four of the six
policy variables remain significant.
It is natural to consider whether exits from welfare differ by quarter.  Given that the
structure of employment differs dramatically across our sites, quarter effects could well be site-
specific.  In fact, inspection of Figure 2 suggests that exits do vary by quarter in several of the
sites.  When dummies for quarter are entered, they do not approach statistical significance (either
jointly or separately), but when quarter effects are permitted to vary across sites, 3 of the 15
coefficients are statistically significant, and the F statistic for the 15 site-specific quarter
coefficients, considered together, is easily statistically significant.  Equation 4 in Table 4 shows
how results are altered by inclusion of these 15 measures.   Here the coefficient of unemployment
is !0.06 and is statistically significant, implying that the number of exits declines by 6 percent
for each percentage point increase in unemployment.  Coefficients on the policy measures are not
reduced substantially.
A variety of specifications were considered to see if any alternative could better capture
18
the influence of economic conditions.  A specification with a lagged dependent variable was
considered, but the coefficient on the lag was not statistically significant and other coefficients
were not altered substantially. One concern is that the impacts of the economy could differ across
sites.  When the single measure of unemployment was replaced with five site-unemployment
interaction terms, the F-test indicated that differences between coefficient estimates were not
statistically significant.
Table 5 presents several specifications using alternative measures of economic conditions
but with impact constrained to be the same across sites.  Equation 1 reproduces the last equation
in the previous table, showing a statistically significant impact of unemployment.  There is no
evidence that considering more unemployment lags (equations 2 and 3) or combining the
previous year's unemployment rate into a single measure (equation 4) better captures the effect of
the economy.   We also tested specifications that considered up to eight quarterly unemployment
lags, as well as average annual unemployment for two prior years.  None of the alternative
specifications suggests a more important role of unemployment than that indicated by the single
unemployment measure entered in equation 1.  The last two columns list an estimation equation
that replaces unemployment with metropolitan employment growth, measured as a quarterly
percentage.  The two specifications are typical of the many that were tested in that they fail to
suggest any impact of employment growth.
Measures of labor market conditions based on the metropolitan area have the advantage
that welfare policies are unlikely to affect them, since, in each of the sites, the metropolitan area
8The exception is that Broward County is both the metropolitan area and the central
county.  However, in this case, the welfare population is heavily concentrated in the city of Fort
Lauderdale, which contains a relatively small portion of the county population, so employment
statistics for the county are unlikely to be substantially influenced by welfare policies.
19
contains populations outside the county with relatively low welfare rates.8  Since the
metropolitan area is constructed to be an integrated labor market, measures at this level should
capture opportunities for residents in the central county.  However, if, as some have suggested,
inner city residents have limited mobility (Kain 1992), metropolitan measures may not represent
welfare recipients’ employment prospects.  In order to examine whether measures at the level of
the county perform better, the lower part of Table 5 presents data for measures of economic
condition in the county.  Results for unemployment in the county are very similar to those
obtained for metropolitan unemployment.  Current unemployment appears related to exit rates,
and considering lagged effects does not suggest stronger impacts.  Employment growth in the
county, like employment growth for the metropolitan area, has no observable relationship with
exit rates.
A potential shortcoming of county-level measures is that they may be influenced by the
welfare exit rate.  If welfare recipients were to leave welfare in greater numbers during a
particular period for reasons unrelated to economic conditions--perhaps due to welfare reform--
their numbers would tend to induce unemployment.  The estimated negative impact of
unemployment on welfare would then be biased toward zero.  In order to remove such bias,
predicted employment growth at the level of the county was constructed based on the distribution
of employment across two-digit industries in the county, combined with the national rate of
employment growth in each of the industries.  Such “shift-share” growth rates indicate the
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growth that would occur in the county if each industry grew at the national average and so, in
large part, identify the impact of shifts in national demand and industry-specific technological
growth.  They should therefore be largely free from the impacts of local area policies.  Predicted
growth in prior quarters was found to have a substantial correlation with the unemployment rate,
suggesting that it could serve as an appropriate instrument.  However, once site-specific time
trends were introduced, the shift-share measures displayed very little independent association
with unemployment.  In none of the instrumental variable specifications considered was the
coefficient of unemployment or its lag estimated with any precision, and estimated effects were
never statistically significant.  A similar approach using national unemployment rates to
instrument local unemployment was not successful.
Given that the policy environment was changing dramatically over the 1990s, it is natural
to ask whether the impact of economic conditions changed.  The Council of Economic Advisors
(1999) report found that economic conditions had a substantial and similar impact in the 1990s as
in earlier periods, while Ziliak et al. (1998) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999) found that the impact of
economic factors was greater in the presence of the welfare reforms that occurred in the 1990s. 
In the analyses here, interactions between the metropolitan unemployment rate and time never
approached statistical significance in their effects on exit rates.  Similarly, interactions between
the unemployment rate and various measures of policy failed to yield significant effects.
In the literature that focuses on predicting caseloads, the most common measures of
welfare policy are variables coded to the dates when federal waivers were granted to states and
when TANF was implemented in the state.   Table 6, equation 1, shows that measures based on
waivers and TANF implementation have coefficients that are both substantial and statistically
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significant.  However, these measures provide little explanation of exit rates that is independent
of that given by the six welfare policy measures we have constructed, which apply for each of the
sites.  When both the waiver measures and other policy measures are entered together (equation
2), neither the waiver nor TANF measure is statistically significant.  Finally, equation 3 in Table
6 replaces the aggregate measures with 26 dummy variables, each capturing an observed policy
event for a particular site, coded one for the quarter of the event and each quarter after, and zero
for prior quarters.  An F-test indicates that the explained variance associated with these
additional coefficients is not statistically significant.  Comparing across the three variations of
the equation, we see that the estimated impact of unemployment is not influenced by differences
in the policy controls.
In summary, whereas our estimates of the impact of unemployment suggest that economic
factors played a role in increasing exit rates, the estimated impacts of policy variables is
substantially greater.  Although we are cautious about claiming either that our policy measures
fully capture the impact of policy changes or that they capture only these impacts, our findings do
suggest that changes outside the labor market--changes at least correlated with policy reform--are
critical in explaining increases in exit rates.
Explaining Welfare Entry Rates
We saw earlier that reductions in welfare caseloads are due both to declines in the rate at
which individuals enter welfare and to increases in the exit rate.  Regression equations are fitted
predicting the natural logarithm of the number of individuals beginning to receive welfare in a
9While it may appear preferable to express this rate as a proportion of the population at
risk (young women) or to use population as an independent variable predicting movement, in
practice it makes little difference.   Changes in population or demographic group size are small
over the period considered and are therefore accounted for by the site-specific time trends.
10Correcting for autocorrelation of the error in equation 1 reduces the estimated
coefficient by about 15 percent, but it remains statistically significant.
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given quarter divided by the county's total population.9  The basic structure of these equations
parallels that for the exit rate.    
Equation 1 in Table 7 shows that, in the absence of controls for welfare policy or time
trends, high unemployment in the metropolitan area appears to increase the entry rate.10 
Equations 2 and 3 show that this apparent impact is spurious.  The estimated impact of
unemployment is reduced dramatically when measures of welfare policy are controlled. 
Specification tests indicate that seasonal impacts differ across sites, so equation 3 controls for
site-specific quarter effects and time trends.  We see that these controls cause the impact of
unemployment to be negative, although it is not statistically significant.  
The residual in equation 3 displays a statistically significant negative autocorrelation,
suggesting difficulties with the specifications.  It turns out that this negative autocorrelation is
related to the six policy measures.  Equation 4 replaces these measures with the conventional
measures of policy, identifying federal waivers and TANF implementation, producing a
specification with a much smaller negative residual autocorrelation.  Equation 5 enters a lagged
dependent variable as a way to account for the negative autocorrelation, retaining our basic
policy measures.  While equations 3-5 have obvious shortcomings, in none of them is there any
suggestion that an increase in the unemployment rate spurs entry into welfare.
Various lag structures for unemployment and employment growth were also considered,
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both in specifications with a lagged dependent variable and without.  In several cases, lagged
measures of unemployment were statistically significant, but successive lags entering into an
equation generally had opposite signs.  Overall, the implied impact of unemployment was small
and negative, consistent with the estimated coefficients in equations 3-5 in Table 7.  In no case
did  any specification using metropolitan unemployment or employment growth imply that local
economic conditions had the expected overall positive impact on welfare entries.  Results were
no different for measures of unemployment or employment growth at the county level, and
attempts to instrument with shift-share measures of employment growth or the national
unemployment rate were not successful.
The composite measures of local welfare policy all have the expected negative impacts on
the rate of entry into welfare.  Coefficients for at least four of the six site-specific policy
measures are statistically significant in all specifications.  These results suggest that state policies
have a substantial influence on the number of arrivals.  Of course, our earlier warnings about the
validity of our policy measures apply with particular force in interpreting these estimates.  Many
of the policy changes are explicitly focused on current welfare recipients.  For example, the
dummy for Atlanta identifies the quarter in which all welfare recipients who had not signed a
self-sufficiency pact were removed from the rolls, which would not directly affect entry rates. 
The substantial negative coefficient in this specification must be due to indirect effects or to
other policy changes occurring at the same time.  In general, treatment of recipients should
influence those considering whether to apply for aid, and we suspect that policy actions--whether
or not captured by our measures--played a substantial role in observed declines in entry rate. 
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Comparisons with Prior Work on the Determinants of the Welfare Caseload
The conclusions here differ from those of previous studies, which generally find that
economic factors are at least as important as policy in predicting the welfare caseload declines of
the 1990s.  We find policy measures to have a substantial and robust impact on welfare exits and
entry and that these effects are much larger than the effects of economic factors.  The greater
impact of policy in our specifications is very likely due to use of more detailed measures of
policy in our specification.  In predicting exit rates, specifications that included the conventional
measures, identifying federal waivers and TANF implementation, displayed statistically
significant impacts,  but the six site-specific composites constructed for the work here increased
explanatory power substantially (Table 6).  Similarly, specifications predicting entry rate using
the conventional measures explained appreciably less variation than did the composites (Table
7).  While the measures employed in our analyses are rough, they are more detailed than the
policy measures in any prior work.
The measures of economic conditions used in these analyses are less than ideal, and it is
tempting to attribute the small estimated impacts to this.  In a study that examined exit from
welfare for individuals in California 1987-1992, Hoynes (1996) finds that county employment
growth and industry-specific income are better predictors of leaving welfare than the
unemployment rate.   In analyses of the welfare caseload, Blank (1997), Bartik and Eberts (1999)
and Wallace and Blank (1999) show that measures based on wages for low-skilled workers may
better capture economic opportunities than the unemployment rate.  Despite these results, most
analyses suggest that the unemployment rate captures much that is relevant about the local labor
market for welfare recipients.  Many of the studies that have examined the caseload decline use
11These are based on coefficients estimated in model 2 in Table 2 of the Council of
Economic Advisors (1999) report.
12If the arrival and departure rates remain constant, the caseload approaches the stable
level rP/d, where r is the arrival rate, P is the population, and d is the exit rate.
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the unemployment rate as their only or primary measure of economic conditions (Council of
Economic Advisors 1997, 1999; Ziliak et al. 1998; Moffitt 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000).
In fact, our estimates of the impacts of economic factors are not seriously discrepant from
those of other studies.  Consider the CEA (1999) estimates of the impact of the unemployment
rate, which indicate that an increase of one percentage point in unemployment induces a 0.3
percent decline in the current caseload, a 1.3 percent increase in the following year, and a 3.9
percent increase two years ahead, implying that a permanent one point increase would produce a
long-run impact of 4.9 percent.11  Compare this with our estimates of the impact of
unemployment reported in equation 4 of Table 4.  A one-percentage-point increase in
unemployment causes the exit rate to decline by 6 percent.  Given a departure rate of 10 percent
(close to the mean for our sites), this means that, in each quarter, a one-percentage-point
increment in unemployment causes the caseload to increase by 0.6 percent.  If unemployment
remains elevated for a full year, the caseload increases by approximately 2 percent.  Based on the
lag structure implicit in this calculation, if the increase in the unemployment rate is permanent,
the caseload ultimately increases by 6.4 percent,12 somewhat more than that implied by the three
lags of unemployment in the CEA caseload analysis but well within the sampling error of the
estimates.  In short, our estimates of the impact of unemployment on exit rate alone are sufficient
to produce the relationship between unemployment and the caseload found in the CEA study.
Our finding that arrivals onto welfare are not responsive to economic conditions, while
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difficult to explain in terms of theory, corresponds with findings of the few studies that have
examined this.  Gittleman (2000) finds no evidence that economic conditions play any role in
predicting transitions to welfare, whereas exits display a modest response.  Blank and Ruggles
(1994) report that economic conditions have no effect on welfare recidivism.
While they are consistent with previous work, estimates of the impact of economic
factors reported here are not very precise.  This reflects the fact that the data cover a period in
which both economic growth and welfare reforms display strong secular trends.  It is notable,
however, that the measures of policy change in these analyses have substantial and robust
impacts in predicting both exit and entry rates.  While it is not possible to assure that policy
changes were not timed to correspond with strong economic growth, it seems unlikely such
reverse causation would drive all our results.  We suggest that a principal lesson of these analyses
is that even rough measures like those used here may reveal the impact of policy changes in local
environments.  Much of the decline in caseloads nationally may well be due to administrative
reforms that have not been coded in any of the caseload research that uses differences across
states.
IV. Employment Rates for Welfare Leavers
While the reduction in the caseload is perhaps a primary concern of welfare reform, in
most states this is coupled with an emphasis on moving recipients into self-supporting
employment.  Although the success of the reforms hinges, in part, on their ability to assure that
welfare leavers obtain employment, no studies to date provide any indication of whether welfare
reform has in fact increased employment levels for welfare leavers.  While it is clear that current
13Estimated coefficients and statistical significance in equations 1 and 2 are essentially
unchanged when we use the standard correction for autocorrelated errors.
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welfare recipients are working at higher rates than in the past (often a direct result of work
requirements), none of the studies of those who leave welfare provides any comparison between
current leavers and those who left under previous policy regimes.
Welfare-leaver employment rates in the quarter following exit are presented in Figure 3
(solid line).  The proportion is increasing in all sites (note the trend line), supporting the view
that welfare reform has been successful.  Still, there are substantial differences across sites.  In
the final study years, the employment rate exceeds 60 percent in Kansas City, whereas in
Baltimore the final level is around 55 percent.  Fort Lauderdale has the lowest initial employment
rate, in the range of 30 percent, but it increases to over 50 percent by the final year.  The
proportion of welfare leavers with jobs in Houston oscillates in the 45-55 percent range and
increases less over time, whereas that in Atlanta increases to over 60 percent until a major
decline occurs in the last year.
Table 8 reports regression equations predicting the employment rate of welfare leavers,
following the same basic structure as those for exit and entry rates.  When only site dummies are
controlled, there is an appreciable impact of the metropolitan unemployment rate and its lagged
values.  The estimated impact changes little when policy composites for each site and site-
specific time trends are included (equations 2 and 3).13 In contrast to analyses focusing on exit
and entry rates, it is clear that unemployment has a substantial impact on the employment rate for
welfare leavers, with the current value and the twice-lagged value being statistically significant. 
Summing the coefficients for the three unemployment measures in equation 3 to determine the
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impact of a long-term change in unemployment indicates that each percentage-point decline in
unemployment induces a 9.2 percent increase in the employment rate for welfare leavers.
Equation 4 includes a lag-dependent variable.  Once the lag is entered, site-specific
quarter effects are statistically significant, and these are controlled in equation 5.  Although
coefficient estimates for unemployment and its lags clearly differ in the lag-dependent variable
specifications, the total impact of unemployment is quite similar when account is taken of the
recursive effects that are relevant in these models.  Equation 4 implies that a permanent one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate ultimately reduces employment by 9.3
percent, while equation 5 implies an estimate of 8.4 percent.
In contrast to analyses predicting exit from and entry to welfare, Table 8 shows that
welfare policy composites have small and inconsistent impacts on welfare leavers’ employment. 
The only measure that has a large impact is the imposition of the rule in Atlanta under which
recipients who failed to enter into self-sufficiency pacts were dropped from welfare.  As might be
expected, this policy removed from the rolls individuals who were less likely to find employment
than those who left welfare under less coercive circumstances.
Table 9 tests a variety of alternative specifications for measures of local economic
conditions.  Controls are the same as in equation 5 of Table 8.  The basic inference that
unemployment has an appreciable influence is robust to all the alternatives considered.  Entering
current unemployment implies that a one-percentage-point permanent fall in unemployment
increases welfare leavers' employment by 7.9 percent, while specifications that allow for more
lags imply long-run increases varying between 8.2 and 8.4 percent.   The lower panel of Table 9
shows that when unemployment is measured at the county level, the estimated impact is very
14We have also included the lag-dependent variable in the prediction, substituting in the
predicted value from the prior quarter.
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similar.   In the rightmost columns of the table, coefficients for employment growth are reported. 
Employment growth appears unrelated to the rate of employment for welfare leavers.
As an indicator of the importance of economic conditions, the coefficients in our
preferred specification (Table 8, equation 5) were used to graph the change in the leavers’
employment rate at each site that can be attributed to variation in the unemployment rate.  The
dark dotted lines in Figure 3 indicate the predicted employment rates of welfare leavers when all
factors except unemployment are held constant.14  To simplify the comparison, we have
normalized the predicted value so that it corresponds to the observed value at the beginning of
the data series.  In each site, the predicted employment rate increases beginning in the early to
mid-1990s.  
The comparison between observed and predicted employment rates for welfare leavers
suggests that leavers' employment in Fort Lauderdale is growing substantially faster than would
be predicted on the basis of improved economic conditions, whereas growth for Houston lags the
prediction.  In each of the other sites, it is clear that a large portion of observed gains in leavers'
employment are explained by economic conditions.
The importance of economic conditions in predicting the employment rate for welfare
leavers suggests that if we measure the success of welfare reform by whether it ensures jobs for
those who exit welfare, success depends critically on the economy.  Were it not for the dramatic
declines in unemployment, improvements in leavers' employment rates would be small in three
of our sites and negative for Houston.  The exception is that, in Fort Lauderdale, the role of
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economic conditions has been modest, and very fast growth in the employment rate of welfare
leavers is not tied to the economy.  However, the employment rate in Fort Lauderdale was very
low in the early 1990s, suggesting that circumstances at this site may be different from the others.
V.  Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that welfare policy is more important than economic factors in
explaining the dramatic declines in the welfare caseloads that have taken place since the early to
mid-1990s.  While our conclusions about the relative importance of policy are at variance with
those of the recent literature focusing on caseload declines, we believe our results are a more
reliable indicator of the dynamics of welfare during recent reforms.  Most of the literature
examining caseload changes uses data for states over a 20-year period, during most of which
AFDC specified a set of eligibility rules that imposed a common program structure across states. 
These studies’ attempts to capture policy changes during the 1990s rely on the timing of federal
waivers and TANF implementation, measures that are surely rough proxies for state policy
changes.
Using our more detailed measures designed to capture state legislative and administrative
changes suggest that policy has substantial effects on caseload flows.  Nonetheless, it must be
recognized that unmeasured economic or social changes correlated with our policy measures
could be of importance, causing estimates of policy impact to be spurious.  Conversely, major
administrative changes could easily exert impacts through various lagged processes that may not
be captured by our measures.  It is certainly possible that welfare policy, broadly construed,
played a more important role in explaining caseload declines than is implied by the estimated
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coefficients on our policy variables.
Although our analyses focus on only five areas, all of these areas display declines in
welfare caseloads that are typical for the nation.  They also display a variety of reform patterns,
including various levels of government activity.  Although it seems likely that results would
apply for most urban areas, such generalization cannot be based on statistical inference.
Our analysis of employment rates for welfare leavers suggests that the existing studies of
the welfare caseload have misconstrued the critical issues in judging welfare reform.  These
studies implicitly define the success of welfare reforms by the extent to which they have induced
declines in the number of recipients.  By this measure, since our results imply that policy changes
alone have been sufficient to reduce the welfare rolls, welfare reform would be rated a success. 
Of course, this ignores the issue of what happens to those who leave welfare.  
Our data allow us to respond to this concern.  We show that those leaving welfare are
obtaining jobs at higher rates than previously, suggesting that the reforms show some level of
success.  However, in contrast to measures of success based on caseload declines, here the strong
economy plays a critical role.  In the absence of observed declines in unemployment rates, an
appreciably smaller proportion of former welfare recipients would be observed working, and in
three of our five sites there would have been little improvement over time.  For Houston, there
would have been a decline whereas in Fort Lauderdale the increase in employment (from its very
low level) would have occurred even if unemployment had not declined.
Our conclusion is that an economic downturn is not likely to cause the welfare caseload
to increase to previous levels, so states need not fear that their TANF budgets will bloat.  On the
other hand, insofar as reforms are judged by the employment of former welfare recipients, we
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would expect that a serious economic reversal would raise questions about whether welfare
reform was living up to its promise.  To date, although reforms have been effective in cutting the
caseload, it is the strong economy that has provided improved employment opportunities for
those who have left welfare.
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Table 1: Coding of Legislative and Administrative Changes 
Affecting Welfare Programs at Study Sites
Site
Year:
Quarter Event Coding
Atlanta 1993:4 Federal waiver granted allowing work
requirements.
Waiver,
Composite
1995:3 JOBS adopts “work first” approach. Compositeb c
1995:4 Federal waiver granted allowing additional work
requirements.
Compositeb c
1996:3 Additional work requirements implemented.Compositec
1997:1 State welfare reform passed. Compositeb c
1997:3 Welfare-to-work efforts expanded. Composite
1997:3 Recipients dropped if they fail to sign personal
responsibility pact.
Dummy
1997:4 TANF  implemented. TANF
Baltimore 1995:4 Maryland welfare reform (FIP) implemented.Composite
1996:3 Federal waiver granted allowing work
requirements.
Waiver,
Composite
1996:4 Welfare avoidance grants implemented. Composite
1996:4 TANF implemented. TANF
Fort
Lauderdale
1996:4 Florida welfare reform (WAGES) implemented.Composite
1996:4 TANF implemented. TANF
1997:4 Local workforce coalition established. Composite
Houston 1995:3 JOBS program transferred to newly created
Texas Workforce Commission.
Composite
1995:4 JOBS adopts “work first” approach. Composite
1996:1 Federal waiver granted allowing work
requirements, time limits.
Waiver
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1996:2 Childcare programs transferred to Texas
Workforce Commission.
Composite
1996:4 Sanctions implemented statewide. Composite
1996:4 TANF implemented. TANF
1997:1 State time limit implemented. Composite
1997:4 New rules require workforce orientation for
applicants; Texas Works initiated statewide.
Composite
Kansas
City
1994:4 Missouri welfare reform implemented. Composite
1995:2 Federal waiver granted allowing work
requirements.
Waiver,
Composite
1996:4 New JOBS participation requirements
implemented.
Composite
1996:4 TANF implemented. TANF
1997:1 Post-employment case management
implemented.
Composite
1997:3 Casework specialization implemented. Composite
1997:4 JOBS adopts “work first” approach. Compositea
Key: Composite: Included in the cumulative sum for a given site, each component coded 1
in the quarter when the event occurred and all later quarters.
Dummy: Included as dummy variable for quarter only.
Waiver: Federal waiver dummy coded 1 beginning in quarter of approval.
TANF:  TANF dummy coded 1 beginning in quarter of implementation.
aItems omitted from composite in regressions predicting exit rate.
bItem omitted from composite in regressions predicting entry rate.
cItem omitted from composite in regressions predicting leavers' employment rate.
Source: Waiver approval dates are those for waivers allowing work requirements, as specified
in Ziliak et al. (1998).  Dates for TANF implementation are those in the Council of Economic 
Advisors (1999) report.  Other dates are based on state and local administrative directives and
interviews with government officials (see Hotchkiss et al. 1999, for further detail).
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            Table 2: Welfare Caseload Trends
Initial Maximum Final
Area Quarter Caseload Quarter Caseload
Change
from Initial Quarter Caseload
Change from
Maximum
Atlanta 92:1 20,461 94:3 22,031 7.6% 97:4 14,473 -34.3%
Baltimore 90:1 33,611 92:3 38,217 13.7% 97:3 23,947 -37.3%
Fort
Lauderdale 93:1 17,673 93:3 19,265 9.0% 97:4 6,646 -65.5%
Houston 92:4 55,960 92:4 55,960 - 97:4 24,698 -56.9%
Kansas
City 90:3 10,890 94:3 14,560 33.7% 97:4 10,847 -25.5%
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Table 3: Contribution of Welfare Exit and Entry Flows to Caseload Declines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Maximum
Projected
Final
Caseload
Projected 
Caseload with
Exit Rate
Increase
Projected 
Caseload with
Entry Rate
Decline
Observed
Final
Caseload
Decline due to: Observed
Decline from
Projected
Maximum
Exit Rate
Change
Entry Rate
Change
Atlanta 25,176 18,147 20,799 14,473 -28% -17% -42%
Baltimore 44,651 29,278 37,982 23,947 -34% -15% -46%
Fort Lauderdale 19,497 10,314 13,392 6,646 -47% -31% -66%
Houston 59,885 42,450 37,500 24,698 -29% -37% -59%
Kansas City 15,806 12,217 14,173 10,847 -23% -10% -31%
Notes: 
Column 1: Projected final caseload with no change in exit or entry rate.  Projected final quarter caseload based on information in
quarter q is solved recursively using c^t+1=c^t (1 - d) + r Pt  , for all t$q, where c^t is the projected caseload at t;  is the initial exit rate
(number of cases exiting welfare divided by the caseload) and r is the initial entry rate (number of cases entering welfare divided by
county population), with each initial exit and entry rate calculated as the mean for q and the three prior quarters; and Pt is the county
population in quarter t.  The initial projected caseload is set equal to the observed caseload, i.e., c^q = cq.  Initial quarter q is chosen to
maximize the projected caseload.
Column 2: Projected final quarter caseload with no change in entry rate but incorporating changes in exit rate.  Projection based on  
c^t+1=c^t (1 - dt) + r Pt  for  t$q, where dt is the observed exit rate in quarter t.  Ini ial quarter q and exit rate r are those used above.
Column 3: Projected final quarter caseload with no change in exit rate but incorporating changes in entry rate.  Projection based on 
c^t+1=c^t (1 - d) + rt Pt  for  t$q, where rt  is the observed entry rate in quarter t.  Ini ial quarter q and entry rate d are those used above.
Column 4: Observed final caseload.
Columns 5-7: Declines in caseload as indicated by projected values in columns 2-4 relative to the projected value in column 1.
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Table 4: Determinants of Welfare Exit Rate
Dependent Variable: ln(Exits/Caseload)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Metropolitan Area Unemployment Rate-.174
(.020)
-.058
(.020)
-.020
(.024)
-.060
(.024)
Welfare Policy Composites
Atlanta .057
(.017)
.016
(.041)
.033
(.039)
    Baltimore .178
(.024)
.141
(.034)
.135
(.031)
    Fort Lauderdale .396
(.059)
.247
(.078)
.296
(.075)
    Houston .056
(.016)
.048
(.033)
.073
(.031)
    Kansas City .073
(.018)
.132
(.032)
.129
(.032)
Atlanta Pact Requirement .586
(.149)
.584
(.142)
.566
(.142)
Site Dummies X X X X
Site-Specific Time Trends X X
Site-Specific Quarter Effects X
Adjusted R2 .8258 .9106 .9183 .9327
Autocorrelationa .323* -.110 -.168 -.085
N 126 126 126 126
Notes: Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. 
aAutocorrelation here and below is calculated as ('s 't e^st e^s t+1)/'s 't e^st2 , where ^st is the
residual in the model for site s in quarter t, and where the summations are understood to include
observed data points.  This may be interpreted as a weighted average of the autocorrelations
across the five sites, where the weight is the sum of squares of the residual for observations in
each site.  Estimates based on the standard correction for autocorrelation that are reported in the
text use this as the autocorrelation.  Autocorrelations statistically significant at the 0.05 level
according to Durbin’s H are identified by asterisks.  
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Table 5: Effects of Local Economic Conditions on Welfare Exit Rate
Dependent Variable:
ln(Exits/Caseload) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Metropolitan Based Measures
Independent Variables Unemployment Rate Employment Growth
Current -.060
(.024)
-.043
(.044)
-.077
(.053)
-.010
(.041)
-.017
(.023)
-.015
(.023)
Lagged 1 -.004
(.048)
.063
(.052)
.015
(.023)
Lagged 2 .002
(.035)
-.034
(.051)
-.026
(.023)
Lagged 3 -.022
(.048)
Lagged 4 .039
(.047)
Lagged 5 -.039
(.048)
Lagged 6 .012
(.035)
Prior Year Unemployment .029
(.030)
Dependent Variable:
ln(Exits/Caseload)
(7) (8) (9) (10)
County-Based Measures
Independent Variables Unemployment Rate Employment Growth
Current -.046
(.018)
-.050
(.034)
.004
(.019)
.009
(.020)
Lagged 1 .010
(.041)
.004
(.020)
Lagged 2 .009
(.030)
.012
(.020)
Notes: Variables controlled: Site dummies, site-specific time trends, welfare policy composites,
the Atlanta pact dummy, and site-specific quarter effects.  Coefficient standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 6: Effects of Policy Measures on Welfare Exit Rate
Dependent Variable: ln(Exits/Caseload)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Metropolitan Area Unemployment -.059
(.027)
-.061
(.025)
-.064
(.027)
Federal Welfare Policy
Federal Waivers .215
(.049)
.039
(.068)
Entered
TANF Implementation .110
(.052)
.032
(.067)
Welfare Policy Composites as
Atlanta .037
(.041)
Baltimore .111
(.050)
26
Fort Lauderdale .270
(.088)
Houston .058
(.039)
Dummy
Kansas City .110
(.045)
Atlanta Pact Requirement .576
(.145)
Variables
Site Dummies X X X
Site-Specific Time Trends X X X
Site-Specific Quarter Effects X X X
Adjusted R2 .9111 .9315 .9249
Autocorrelation -.010 -.087 -.156
N 126 126 126
Notes: Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses.  Autocorrelations statistically
significant at the 0.05 level according to Durbin’s H are identified by asterisks.  
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Table 7: Determinants of Welfare Entry Rate
Dependent Variable: ln(Entries/Population)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag-Dependent Variable -.530
(.109)
Metropolitan Area Unemployment Rate .153
(.021)
.036
(.022)
-.022
(.031)
-.041
(.033)
-.060
(.032)
Federal Welfare Policy
Federal Waivers -.022
(.055)
TANF Implementation -.130
(.051)
Welfare Policy Composites 
Atlanta -.261
(.053)
-.238
(.069)
-.398
(.073)
    Baltimore -.107
(.025)
-.108
(.033)
-.159
(.032)
    Fort Lauderdale -.247
(.064)
-.033
(.084)
-.062
(.079)
    Houston -.121
(.018)
-.074
(.036)
-.096
(.037)
    Kansas City -.028
(.018)
-.027
(.028)
-.042
(.026)
Atlanta Pact Requirement -.465
(.160)
-.311
(.152)
-.368
(.138)
Site Dummies X X X X X
Site-Specific Time Trends X X X
Site-Specific Quarter Effects X X X
Adjusted R2 .6747 .8131 .8601 .8301 .8890
Autocorrelation .268* -.200* -.388* -.109 -.086
N 122 122 122 122 117
Notes: Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses.  Autocorrelations statistically
significant at the 0.05 level according to Durbin’s H are identified by asterisks.  
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                  Table 8: Determinants of Employment for Welfare Leavers
Dependent Variable: ln(Employed Leavers/Leavers)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag-Dependent Variable .211
(.095)
.335
(.091)
Metropolitan Area Unemployment Rate
Current -.024
(.016)
-.032
(.013)
-.037
(.014)
-.030
(.014)
-.029
(.020)
Lagged 1 -.032
(.019)
-.028
(.015)
-.025
(.015)
-.007
(.015)
.047
(.026)
Lagged 2 -.035
(.013)
-.034
(.011)
-.030
(.011)
-.036
(.013)
-.074
(.018)
Welfare Policy Composites
Atlanta -.138
(.043)
-.145
(.047)
-.093
(.048)
-.069
(.042)
    Baltimore .017
(.010)
.034
(.014)
.021
(.014)
.007
(.013)
    Fort Lauderdale .116
(.024)
.059
(.032)
.031
(.031)
.021
(.029)
    Houston -.026
(.007)
.007
(.014)
.005
(.013)
-.001
(.012)
    Kansas City .011
(.007)
.005
(.011)
-.004
(.011)
.007
(.010)
Atlanta Pact Requirement -.154
(.058)
-.160
(.060)
-.145
(.056)
-.153
(.052)
Site Dummies X X X X X
Site-Specific Time Trends X X X
Site-Specific Quarter Effect X
Adjusted R2 .8436 .8981 .9076 .9157 .9383
Autocorrelation .474* .198* .159 .015 -.050
N 125 125 125 121 121
Notes: Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses.  Autocorrelations statistically
significant at the 0.05 level according to Durbin’s H are identified by asterisks.  
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Table 9: Effects of Local Economic Conditions on Employment for Welfare Leavers
Dependent Variable: ln(Employed Leavers/Leavers)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag-Dependent Variable .496
(.089)
.335
(.091)
.191
(.103)
.270
(.095)
.575
(.084)
.525
(.085)
Metropolitan Based Measures
Unemployment Rate Employment Growth
Current -.040
(.014)
-.029
(.020)
-.053
(.024)
-.005
(.016)
-.0076
(.0089)
-.0080
(.0088)
Lagged 1 .047
(.026)
.045
(.031)
-.0017
(.0098)
Lagged 2 -.074
(.018)
-.046
(.025)
-.0078
(.0094)
Lagged 3 .010
(.018)
Lagged 4 -.027
(.017)
Lagged 5 .003
(.018)
Lagged 6 .002
(.013)
Prior Year -.055
(.015)
Dependent Variable: ln(Employed Leavers/Leavers)
Independent Variables (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag-Dependent Variable .406
(.086)
.215
(.102)
.585
(.084)
.549
(.084)
County Based Measures
Unemployment Rate        Employment Growth
Current -.042
(.010)
-.031
(.015)
.0039
(.0076)
.0065
(.0076)
Lagged 1 .018
(.019)
-.0103
(.0084)
Lagged 2 -.049
(.015)
-.0008
(.0082)
Notes: Variables controlled: Site dummies, site-specific time trends, welfare policy
composites, the Atlanta pact dummy, and site-specific quarter effects. Coefficient standard
errors are in parentheses.
Figure 1. Basic Welfare Caseloads and Unemployment Rates
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Figure 2: Flows Into and Out Of Welfare
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Figure 3. Employment Rates for Welfare Leavers 
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Atlanta 
Baltimore 
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Fort Lauderdale 
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
9
0
:1
9
0
:3
9
1
:1
9
1
:3
9
2
:1
9
2
:3
9
3
:1
9
3
:3
9
4
:1
9
4
:3
9
5
:1
9
5
:3
9
6
:1
9
6
:3
9
7
:1
9
7
:3
Quarters
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Observed Employment Rate Predicted by Unemployment
Linear Trend for Observed
Houston 
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Kansas City 
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
9
0
:1
9
0
:3
9
1
:1
9
1
:3
9
2
:1
9
2
:3
9
3
:1
9
3
:3
9
4
:1
9
4
:3
9
5
:1
9
5
:3
9
6
:1
9
6
:3
9
7
:1
9
7
:3
Quarters
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Observed Employment Rate Predicted by Unemployment
Linear Trend for Observed
